About
I am a microeconomic theorist. My research focuses on auctions, mechanism design, and dynamic games. Currently I work on designing dynamic mechanisms that are immune to collusion among participants and on auction problems with asymmetric bidders.
- Ph.D. in Economics, University of Rochester
- M.A. in Economics, University of Iowa
- M.A. in Management, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
- B.S. in Applied Mathematics, Tongji University
Research
- Dynamic mechanism design with interdependent values
- Collusion proof dynamic mechanisms
- Ambiguity aversion in sequential auctions
- Financial constraints in dynamic auctions and contests
- Bargaining problems with incomplete information
- Contracting with limited commitment
- Information spillover in various strategic settings
Teaching
In the past eight years, I have taught undergraduate level game theory, master level applied microeconomic theory, and PhD level game theory, information economics, contract theory, and mechanism design.
By email appointment.
Econ 4220 Applied Game Theory
Publications
Information spillover in multi-good adverse selection (joint with Bingchao Huangfu) American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2023.
Resource inequality in the war of attrition (joint with Bingchao Huangfu and Gagan Ghosh) International Journal of Game Theory, 2022.
Robust predictions in Coasian bargaining American Economic Review: Insights, 2022
Sequential auctions with ambiguity (joint withGagan Ghosh) Journal of Economic Theory, 2021
Voluntary information disclosure to Cournot oligopolists (joint with Gagan Ghosh) Economics Letters, 2020
Deadlines in the market for lemons Economic Theory Bulletin, 2020
A note on perfect correlated equilibria (joint withGagan Ghosh) Economics Letters, 2020
Sequential second price auctions with private budgets (joint with Gagan Ghosh) Games and Economic Behavior, 2019
Efficient dynamic mechanisms in environments with interdependent valuations: the role of contingent transfers Theoretical Economics, 2018
Correlation and unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoringInternational Journal of Game Theory, 2017
Equilibrium selection in common-value second price auctions Games and Economic Behavior, 2014